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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2A-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Court err in finding the Respondent in contempt of court for not following 
the Decree of Divorce at paragraphs 9, 10 and 20? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for contempt in a civil action is clear and 
convincing evidence. VonHake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). Determinations of law 
are reviewed for correctness. Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 
1993). 
2. Did the Court err in basing the award of a judgment against Respondent on the 
finding of contempt? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for contempt in a civil action is clear and 
convincing evidence. VonHake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). The interpretation of a 
divorce decree is reviewed for correctness, affording the District Court no deference. Hawkins 
v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062 (Utah 2001). 
3. Did the Court err in admitting as evidence a statement made in settlement 
negotiations? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for evidence rulings is clearly erroneous. 
Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
4. Did the Court err in finding Respondent failed to comply with Court orders given 
Respondent's compliance with the Order of the prior judge, the parties' stipulation and the prior 
position of Petitioner? 
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Standard of Review: The standard of review in divorce proceedings is whether evidence 
clearly preponderates to the contrary or the trial court has abused its discretion or misapplied 
principles of law. Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985). 
5. Is Petitioner equitably estopped from claiming past child support given 
Petitioner's acceptance of Respondent's payment of Petitioner's taxes, failure to raise issues of 
prior support and Respondent's reliance on Petitioner's actions? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for findings of fact is clearly erroneous. 
Chen v. Stewart, 123 P.3d 416 (Utah 2005). The standard of review in divorce proceedings has 
abused its discretion or misapplied principles of Law. Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 
1985). 
6. Did Petitioner waive any right to claim back support by agreeing to waive 
payments from Respondent? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for findings of fact is clearly erroneous. 
Chen v. Stewart, 123 P.3d 416 (Utah 2005). The standard of review in divorce proceedings has 
abused its discretion or misapplied principles of Law. Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 
1985). 
7. Is Petitioner entitled to recover attorney's fees? What amount of attorney's fees 
are reasonable and necessary? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for attorney's fees is an abuse of discretion. 
Willev v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997). The standard of review for contract interpretations 
is a review for correctness. Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.2d 1062 (Utah 2001). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-32-1 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein are contempts 
of the authority of the Court: 
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the 
court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding. 
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, tending to 
interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding. 
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by an attorney, 
counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected to perform a judicial or ministerial 
service. 
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by a party to an action 
or special proceeding. 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court. 
(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or counselor of a court, and acting as such 
without authority. 
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order 
or process of such court. 
(8) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, remaining at, 
or returning from, the court where the action is on the calendar for trial. 
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court. 
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or to answer as a 
witness. 
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(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or serve as such, or 
improperly conversing with a party to an action to be tried at such court, or with any other 
person, concerning the merits of such action, or receiving a communication from a party or other 
person in respect to it, without immediately disclosing the same to the court. 
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of the lawful judgment, 
order or process of a superior court, or proceeding in an action or special proceeding contrary to 
law, after such action or special proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of such inferior 
tribunal, magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the lawful orders or process of a judicial officer 
is also a contempt of the authority of such officer. 
Rule 408, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising 
to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising 
to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising 
or attempting to compromise a claim which was 
disputed as to either validity or amount, is not 
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the 
claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or 
statements made in compromise negotiations is 
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require 
the exclusion of any evidence otherwise 
discoverable merely because it is presented in the 
course of compromise negotiations. This rule also 
does not require exclusion when the evidence is 
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or 
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of 
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a 
criminal investigation or prosecution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from an Order from Trial held October 26, 2006 and Objection 
Hearing Held December 18, 2006 of the Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, State of 
Utah. The Presiding Judge is Mark S. Kouris. The divorce petition was originally filed in 1999. 
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A Decree of Divorce was entered April 20, 1999. The parties proceeded forward pursuant to the 
Decree of Divorce and special arrangements of the parties until after Petitioner's remarriage in 
November, 2004. 
Petitioner filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce on March 2, 2005. A stipulation 
regarding the exchange of financial documents was placed on the record and complied with by 
the parties. Petitioner requested that her counsel withdraw and new counsel appeared for 
Petitioner. Petitioner filed an Order to Show Cause. Trial was held on October 26, 2006. The 
Order being appealed from was entered by the Court on January 9, 2007. Appeal is taken from 
Paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 and 11 of this Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts as marshaled to support the Court's findings are stated below. The Court made 
Finding of Fact 10 that Respondent was not credible (Appendix 2 R @ 212). Respondent 
believes this finding is clearly erroneous. However, because of this finding, Respondent relies 
primarily upon evidence presented by or testimony of Petitioner. 
Procedural History. Petitioner and Respondent were divorced in April 20, 1999. 
(Appendix 3, R @ 46-54). The parties are the parents of four children now ranging in age from 
17 to 11. The parties proceeded through their post-divorce lives with various accommodations to 
meet the needs of the children and the financial needs of the children and Petitioner. (Trial Tr. 
@ 45-49). Petitioner testified Respondent was a good father. 
Petitioner remarried in November, 2004. Petitioner's remarriage triggered an automatic 
adjustment of child support to an amount consistent with the guidelines set forth in the Utah 
Code. (Appendix 3, R@ 49, 51). 
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An automatic adjustment of child support took place. Petitioner filed a Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce. (R @ 59-61). An Order to Show Cause related to the Petition to 
Modify was also filed. (R @ 72-73). The Order to Show Cause leading to the Order from Trial 
Held October 26, 2006 and Objection Hearing Held December 18, 2006 (the Order appealed 
from) was filed September 27, 2006. (R @ 165-167). 
Child Support. The Stipulation and Property Settlement, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce all contain a provision providing for child support in 
the amount of $1,000.00 per month. (Appendices 3-5, R @ 14-23, 36-45, 46-54). The Decree 
states that the parties recognize that said amount is less than as provided by the guidelines set 
forth in the Utah Code and have agreed on said amount based upon the entire divorce settlement. 
(Appendix 3, R @ 51). The Child Support Obligation Worksheet identifies the reasons stated by 
the Court for the deviation to be the property settlement and "Respondent is paying larger 
amount of spousal support and will adjust child support to comply with statutory amount upon 
any change to spousal support." (Appendix 6, R @ 24.) 
Upon the termination of alimony, the base child support amount was to be automatically 
adjusted to an amount consistent with the guidelines set forth in the Utah Code. (Appendices 3-
6, R @ 20, 17, 42, 39, 51, 49, 24). The monthly child support obligations were to be 
automatically increased each year by .7% of the Respondent's gross receipts in excess of the 
previous year's gross business receipts (1998 gross receipts determined to be $300,000.00) in 
order to preserve the ratio of monthly child support to Respondent's yearly gross receipts. 
(Appendix 3, R @ 51.) The Respondent's spousal support obligation terminated on the 
Petitioner's remarriage. A termination of spousal support automatically triggered a recalculation 
of the Respondent's child support obligation. (Appendix 3, R @ 49.) 
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Upon the termination of spousal support, the amount of child support was automatically 
increased to $2,061.00. This is the maximum amount in the child support guidelines for four 
minor children. Both Petitioner and Respondent testified that Respondent has paid the $2,061.00 
per month since Petitioner's remarriage. (Trial Tr. 57, 63, 94, 95.) 
The Court ruled that the base child support amount was $2,061.00. (Appendix 1, R @ 
218). This is consistent with the automatic adjustment called for by the Decree of Divorce. The 
Court further found the adjustment based on changes in gross receipts to apply. (Appendix 1, R 
@ 218-219). 
Petitioner to Modify. Petitioner filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce on 
March 2, 2005. The Petition to Modify did not raise any issues regarding back child support. 
The Petition did not claim that any adjusted child support amount above the child support 
guidelines was required. (R @ 59-61). 
On April 4, 2005, a hearing was held on the Order to Show Cause filed by the Petitioner. 
This Order to Show Cause involved the Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. (R @ 72-73, R @ 
85). Petitioner's attorney, Shawn Robinson, placed the partial resolution and stipulation on the 
record. Mr. Robinson stated: 
It is anticipated that the parties are going to 
exchange their tax returns for the years 2002, 2003, 
2004 by April 15th. That's assuming that both 
parties have their 2004 taxes done by that date. 
They'd also - and we didn't specifically talk about 
this but they'd exchange their business - any 
business taxes that they had as well, and their 
personal taxes. (Apr 4, 2005 OSC Tr. @ 2). 
Petitioner's counsel then stated that the issue of modification of the amount of child 
support was being reserved. (Apr 4, 2005 OSC Tr. @ 2-3). Nothing was stated regarding any 
issue of prior child support. (R @ 59-61, 72-73). 
10 
Petitioner provided copies of her tax returns for the three agreed upon years. Respondent 
provided his tax returns for the three agreed upon years. The tax returns Respondent provided 
included the individual income tax returns and the tax returns for Tooele Valley Spine Center 
(the "Spine Center"). (R @ 91-92). The Spine Center is a professional corporation. The 
Respondent is the president of the Spine Center and is employed as a chiropractic physician. 
Respondent's gross receipts were contained in the tax returns of the Spine Center for the 
years 2002-2004. Petitioner's Request for Production of documents implicitly acknowledges the 
tax information agreed to be exchanged was exchanged. The Request for Production was for 
Form 8582 (a form not filed with the IRS), business returns for companies other than the Spine 
Center and K-l forms. (R @ 102-104). 
The Petitioner sought further business records with a Request for Production of 
Documents dated November 2, 2005.] (R @ 90.) Respondent complied with the Request for 
Production of Documents. A Certificate of Compliance was filed with the Court on December 7, 
2005. (R @ 91-92.) On March 17, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel. The Motion 
erroneously asserted that the Respondent had not complied with the Request for Production of 
Documents. (R@ 93-95). 
Respondent filed a Memorandum In Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Compel on 
April 3, 2006. Attached to this Memorandum was a copy of the Certificate of Compliance as 
filed with the Court and the actual response to the first Request for Production of Documents. (R 
@ 102-112.) The Court denied Petitioner's Motion to Compel by an Order on Petitioner's 
Motion to Compel dated June 2, 2006. (R @ 115-117.) 
1
 Petitioner has alleged that Respondent has attempted to delay these proceedings. The record shows that the 
documents agreed to be exchanged were exchanged in May, 2005. Petitioner then submitted the documents to an 
accountant. In November, 2005, Petitioner submitted a Request for Production of Documents. However, this 
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At trial, Petitioner testified that financial information had not been provided. On cross-
examination, she testified that the documents might have been received by her prior attorney. 
(Trial Tr. 52-53, 71.) During the hearing on October 16, 2006, Mr. David Friel stated to the 
Court that he had seen the documents provided by the Respondent. 
Taxes Paid By Respondent. The Decree of Divorce provides that Respondent shall claim 
the minor children as dependents for tax purposes. The division of exemptions was to be re-
evaluated whenever child support is re-evaluated or modified. (Appendix 3, R @ 50.) Petitioner 
testified that an additional $100.00 was added to the alimony to compensate for the tax 
deductions. (Trial Tr. 38.) Petitioner also testified that the Divorce Decree does not require 
Respondent to pay Petitioner's tax debt. (Trial Tr. 38.) Respondent paid $21,126.00 or more in 
taxes for Petitioner. (Trial Tr. 60-62.) Petitioner testified that sometime between January 2000 
and April 15, 2000, she contacted Respondent and stated she didn't have money to pay her taxes. 
(Trial. Tr. 38). Petitioner testified payment for taxes was not put in any Order of the Court but 
was a verbal agreement because of the tax deductions. (Trial Tr. 39-40). 
Child Support Adjustment Upon Remarriage. Petitioner remarried in November, 2004. 
Following the remarriage, Respondent began paying $2,061.00 per month. (Trial Tr. 57, 63.) 
Petitioner and Respondent, according to Petitioner's testimony, met to discuss child support. 
(Trial Tr. 55-58). The $2,061.00 is the maximum child support per month according to the child 
support guidelines. This amount does not consider Petitioner's income. Both paragraph 9 and 
19 of the Decree of Divorce provide for an automatic adjustment of (or automatic recalculation) 
of Respondent's child support obligation. (Appendix 3, R @ 51, 49.) 
Request for Production of Documents was submitted to Michelle Tack, the Petitioner's prior counsel. The Request 
for Production Documents was served November 2, 2005. 
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Petitioner testified that she did not want an automatic increase but wanted to go to a 
mediator to determine child support. (Trial Tr. 55-58.) Petitioner did not submit any budget 
information to Respondent. (Trial Tr. 58). Petitioner submitted a budget to Shawn Robinson. 
(Trial Tr. 58.) 
Admission of Settlement Letter as Evidence. The Court admitted as evidence Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 6 with the following statement: 
If successful in raising child support, ultimately the 
children will suffer. I will no longer provide the 
additional help that I have in the past. (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 6, Trial Tr. 88-92.) 
Petitioner subsequently testified on cross-examination that she thought Respondent was 
trying to manipulate her. This manipulation was to get a different settlement than Petitioner was 
proposing or to get Petitioner to budget. (Trial Tr. 108.) The Court, sua sponte, asked the 
following questions about the "e-mail" extracted from a settlement letter.2 The Court asked: 
The second question I have for you is concerning 
the e-mail that we talked about a little bit earlier and 
I wanted to know what - when you received that 
note, the part of it that we are talking about, the rest 
of it is - is settlement negotiations, so that's not to 
be brought into a courtroom; but the middle part of 
it, the part indicating that the children will suffer, 
tell me what your perception of that was when you 
read it, what did - what did you think when you 
read it? 
Mrs. Anderson: I thought, you know what, it's 
probably part of a manipulation thing, trying to get 
me to - to see what - to see his side basically. 
'Cause see, in a verbal conversation we had the day 
the - a coup - a few days prior to that, he said the 
same thing. He said 'cause we've got through this 
whole entire divorce, everything, our children 
unscathed, I mean, they're fine, they don't know 
2
 Exhibit 6 was a letter, not an e-mail. Apparently, Petitioner scanned the letter and e-mailed it to Petitioner's 
counsel. 
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any bitterness at all.' And he threatened that with 
me, that he would let them know every - you know, 
I'll tell the kids, the kids don't know everything, 
you know. I'll tell the kids, the kids will find out 
and I'm like, only if you tell them, and then this 
letter came, but I don't think that he would ever 
physically hurt them, I don't. 
The Court then asked: 
But did you believe that his intention when he sent 
it to you, was to say if you were to win, if you were 
to get a judgment in this case, I will be financially 
damaged by that and therefore, the children will 
then suffer because I wouldn't be able to share with 
them everything I'm sharing with them now? Is -
was that your impression? 
Mrs. Anderson: I think it was more than 
manipulation. (Trial Tr. 101-102.) 
On direct examination of the Petitioner called as a witness for the Respondent, Petitioner 
testified that the letter had been prepared while Respondent was at his mother's house with the 
children. (Trial Tr. 106-107.) This was during a traditional hunting weekend for Respondent 
and the children. (Trial Tr. 107.) The pressure was on Respondent to respond back to the 
Petitioner's settlement proposal by a certain time. (Trial Tr. 107.) Petitioner, when asked how 
she took the statement that has been referred to about the children suffering stated that the reason 
they were negotiating at all was because Respondent had called the Petitioner and asked her to 
call him to talk about everything. (Trial Tr. 107-108). Petitioner testified that Respondent made 
the statement to get a different settlement than was being proposed. (Trial Tr. 108). 
Court Findings on Credibility. The Court made a finding that the Respondent was not 
credible. (Appendix 2. Finding of Fact 10 @212.) The bases for this finding were that 
Respondent clearly contradicted himself on two occasions. Respondent indicated he was 
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following all of the different measures inside of the Divorce Decree despite that he had admitted 
that in fact, he was behind on a couple of them. (Trial Tr. 155). 
Respondent testified that he complied with the automatic adjustment of child support. 
(Trial Tr. 79-80.) Respondent also testified that agreements as to extracurricular activities were 
reached. (Trial Tr. 80.) Respondent testified that he had not paid the Christmas amount for 
December, 2005, or the clothing amounts since November, 2005. (Trial Tr. 81-82.) Respondent 
testified as to his understanding of what occurred upon termination of alimony. (Trial Tr. 82.) 
Respondent testified that he had paid half of the non-school extracurricular activities until 
November, 2004. (Trial Tr. 83-84.) Respondent and Petitioner negotiated the agreement to pay 
half each. (Trial Tr. 84.) 
Petitioner's testimony corroborates Respondent's testimony. Respondent complied with 
the agreement regarding activities and lessons. (Trial Tr. 48, 54-55.) 
The Court also found Respondent denied the writing of the letter and then the letter was 
produced and he said at that point his explanations were not corroborated by any other part of the 
case. (Trial Tr. 155). Respondent's explanation of what happened in terms of interpreting the 
Divorce Decree, are unreasonable and incredible. (Trial Tr. 155) The testimony regarding the 
letter has been explained earlier. (See Fact section "Admission of Settlement Letter as 
Evidence"). 
Delay In Action to Enforce Decree. The Court found that Petitioner had reasonable 
explanations for why she waited so long. The Court found that Petitioner attempted to enforce 
the Decree by setting up different mediation dates. The Court found the financial records were 
to be turned over by June 1 of each year. (Appendix B, Finding of Fact 11, R @ 212). 
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Petitioner was asked whether Petitioner said anything to Petitioner in writing that 
Petitioner owed other money. Petitioner did not answer the question directly but testified that 
when Petitioner first got married (November, 2004) that Petitioner and Respondent met. 
Petitioner wanted to go to mediation to set the amount of child support. The two appointments 
Petitioner set with the mediator were after this meeting. (Trial Tr. 55-56). 
Attorney's Fees. The Decree of Divorce in Paragraph 34 provides for reasonable 
attorney's fees if any party should be found in contempt of any Order of this Court. (Appendix 
3, R @ 46). Petitioner was awarded attorney's fees of $7,652.97. Petitioner was ordered to 
prepare an Affidavit of Attorney's Fees. (Appendix 2, R @ 219). Petitioner did not prepare an 
affidavit for the second amount of $1,386.89. 
Summary of Amounts Paid or Claimed. The following table summarizes the child 
support amounts claimed by Petitioner and the tax amounts paid by Respondent. (Appendix 1 
and R @ 60-62). 
Child Taxes Christmas 
Year Support Claimed and Clothing 
2000 $ 8,348.46 
2001 0 
2002 12,065.64 
2003 5,772.00 
2004 0 
2005 0 $2,480.00 
2006 5,700.91 $4,300.00 
$31,997.11 $2,480.00 $4,300.00 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court erred in finding Respondent in contempt of Court. Respondent was 
found to have not provided financial documentation. The exchange of financial documentation 
was addressed before the prior trial judge, Randall Skanchy. As stipulated, Petitioner and 
Total 
$ 8,458.46 
0 
12,065.64 
5,772.00 
0 
2,480.00 
10,000.91 
$38,777.01 
Taxes 
Paid 
$4,000.00 
3,828.00 
5,000.00 
4,153.00 
4,153.00 
$21,126.00 
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Respondent exchanged three years of income information. The Trial Court should not have 
issued ^n Order inconsistent with the Stipulation of the parties, exacerbating the error by using 
the exchange of information as a basis for a finding of contempt. 
The Decree of Divorce provides for an automatic adjustment to take place in accordance 
with the child support guidelines upon the Petitioner's remarriage. This automatic adjustment 
took place. The Petition to Modify Divorce Decree sought an increase above the child support 
guidelines that did not question the automatic adjustment. Respondent complied with the 
obligations of the Decree of Divorce regarding the automatic increase. Petitioner sought an 
amount of child support not based on the Divorce Decree but based upon recommendations of a 
mediator. 
The Decree of Divorce provided Respondent with the right to claim the children as 
dependents. Petitioner's cash flow problem in meeting her taxes resulted in agreement for 
Respondent to pay amounts not required by the Decree of Divorce. 
Petitioner did not claim in writing any additional child support. The discussion of child 
support relied upon by the Trial Court in finding the Petitioner had attempted to enforce the 
Divorce Decree related to future child support beyond the Divorce Decree. Petitioner did not 
seek to enforce or mediate any adjusted child support until bringing the Order to Show Cause in 
September, 2006. 
Petitioner's actions resulted in a waiver of the right to recover additional child support 
prior to the Trial Court's determination of child support going forward. Petitioner is equitably 
estopped from retaining the benefit of the agreements regarding taxes, making other 
accommodations with Respondent, remaining silent as to any claim of past support and then 
recovering amounts not earlier claimed. 
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Respondent should not be held in contempt and should not be responsible for attorney's 
fees. Petitioner has not accounted for or justified the final amount of attorney's fees claimed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN 
CONTEMPT FOR NOT FOLLOWING 
PARAGRAHS 9, 10 AND 20. THE LEGAL 
REQUIREMENTS FOR A FINDING OF 
CONTEMPT ARE NOT PRESENT. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-32-1 provides the acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
Disobedience of any lawful judgment, Order or process of the Court is a basis for a finding of 
contempt. In order to find contempt, the Court must find that the person knew of the 
requirements, had the capacity to comply and intentionally failed or refused to do so. VonHake 
v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). 
This case is not one involving a "deadbeat" dad that failed or refused to pay child 
support. To the contrary, Respondent paid all child support and spousal support as worked out 
by the parties. The Respondent paid more than $21,000.00 to the Petitioner that was not required 
by the Decree of Divorce for Petitioner's taxes. (Trial Tr. 38, 39-40, 60-62). Upon the 
remarriage of the Petitioner, Respondent began paying child support at the maximum amount 
called for by the child support guidelines. (Trial Tr. 57, 63). 
While the Divorce Decree called for automatic adjustments to the amount of child 
support, Petitioner did not want to accept an automatic increase. Petitioner wanted to receive a 
higher amount of child support by going to a mediator. (Trial Tr. 55-58). This was followed by 
the filing of a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. (R @ 59-61). By this Petition, Petitioner 
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did not claim or even reserve a claim for any past-due child support or other amounts. Petitioner 
claimed a right to increased child support. (R @ 59-61). 
The Third District Court received a Partial Resolution and Stipulation on the record 
regarding the documents to be provided by the parties. Both parties agreed that they would 
provide income tax information for 2002, 2003 and 2004. (Apr. 4, 2005 OSC Tr. @ 2). 
Respondent fully complied with this Order of the Court. Petitioner's efforts to obtain additional 
information regarding businesses not owned by or unrelated to Respondent was denied. (R @ 
115-117). 
Petitioner requested the withdrawal of her counsel. (R @ 118-119). With new counsel, 
Petitioner attempted to establish different law of the case. Now, Petitioner did not pursue the 
increase in child support but rather sought prior amounts. The Court, in a manner inconsistent 
with the Stipulation of the Parties, ordered that past financial information be provided. (R @ 
169). Petitioner was not required to provide information. Respondent complied with the Court's 
Order. 
Respondent should not be held in contempt under circumstances where the parties had 
worked for over six years with the financial arrangements. Respondent should not be held in 
contempt when the stipulation of the parties regarding documents was fully complied with and 
the Petitioner pursued a Modification of Decree of Divorce to change future child support. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT 
DISREGARD THE STIPULATION OF THE 
PARTIES AND THELAW OF THE CASE 
PARTICULARLY IN FINDING RESPONDENT 
IN CONTEMPT. 
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From the time of the parties' divorce in 1999 until the remarriage of the Petitioner, the 
Respondent met all financial obligations pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and the 
accommodations made by the parties related to payment for extracurricular activities and lessons 
and payment of Petitioner's taxes. (Trial Tr. 45-49, 38, 60-62). This is evidenced by the 
acceptance of payments by the Petitioner, the lack of any written or oral demands by the 
Petitioner for payment of adjusted child support, the filing of an Order to Show Cause and 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and the stipulation that the financial information to be 
exchanged involved only the prior three years tax returns. 
The Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce claimed a right to $4,100.00 per month in child 
support. The stipulation of the parties was placed on the record by Petitioner's counsel as 
follows: 
It is anticipated that the parties are going to 
exchange their tax returns for the years 2002, 2003, 
2004 by April 15th. That's assuming that both 
parties have their 2004 taxes done by that date. 
They'd also - and we didn't specifically talk about 
this but they'd exchange their business - any 
business taxes that they had as well, and their 
personal taxes. (Apr. 4, 2005 OSC Tr. @ 2). 
Respondent complied with the stipulation entered before Judge Skanchy. (R @ 91-92). 
Petitioner pursued a Motion to Compel for information from other businesses. (R @ 90). 
Respondent complied with Rule 34(b)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by producing the 
available documents as requested and not objected to. (R @ 102-111). Petitioner filed a Motion 
to Compel that the Court denied. (R @ 115-117). Respondent remained in compliance with the 
Court Order and discovery rules. 
The Petitioner dismissed her legal counsel. The Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel states 
the reason to be the request of the Petitioner. (R @ 118-119). New counsel entered an 
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appearance. Pet i t ioner then disregarded her Petition, to Modify and pursued an Order to Show 
Cause c la iming past child support , re imbursement of expei ises ai id otl: lei i i lattei s. I he ti lal c : -\ n It, 
now presided over by Judge Kour is , d isregarded the stipulation and prior Order of the Court. 
ordering Responden t to p rov ide information regarding past gross receipts and income lax returns. 
(R @ 169, Oct. 16, 2006 O S C Tr. @ 23). 
The Supreme Court in the Mat ter of E.H., * *; ^'<- * > tali JUOoh addressed a 
situation in wh ich a st ipulat ion in an adopt ion case was accepted b y the first j udge and voided by 
the second j u d g e . T h e Court noted that the law favors the sett lement of disputes. See, In re EH, 
^ •' "
: , W ,
.
T T C- v . v ^»n.n and Mascaro v. Davis , 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987). 
The Court in In re E H , noted the following: 
A chal lenge to a j u d g e i re\ crsal of a rul ing m a d e 
by a predecessor j u d g e is inevitably composed of 
two issues. The first concerns whether the reversal 
so offends the prudential practice of refusing to 
reopen mat ters that have already been decided that 
it cannot be sustained. This quest ion is central for 
evaluat ing the application of the law of the case 
doctr ine and, as the Court of Appeals correct ly 
noted, is ordinari ly reviewed under an abuse of 
discret ion standard. The second component of an 
inquiry into a reversal of a prior order focuses on 
the nature of the mat ter decided. For example , if 
bo th the original ruling and the one that displaced it 
were based on applications of law each would be 
rev iewed under a correctness standard. W h e n a 
legal quest ion is presented to an appellate court in 
law-of- the-case-packaging, a potential d i l emma can 
arise over which the standard of review to apply. 
W e can identify no reason w h y an erroneous legal 
de terminat ion should be afforded greater discretion 
upon appeal mere ly because it wears the garb of 
law-of-the-case. For purposes of review, then, 
considerat ions of the law of the case must yield to 
those of the substance of the underlying ruling w h e n 
ascert.aini.ng the proper standard of reviev r By 
2i 
stating this rule, we do not intend to diminish the 
importance of the law of the case doctrine, nor do 
we surrender the authority of appellate courts to 
enforce the principal by vacating unexplained and 
unjustified renunciation of prior court orders. 
103P.3d@816. 
Here, Respondent complied with the stipulation of the parties and the Order of Judge 
Skanchy. Then, after a change in strategy, Respondent was held in contempt by Judge Kouris. 
Petitioner should have been held to the stipulation. At least, Respondent should have been 
granted the opportunity to comply with the new, inconsistent Order without facing a contempt 
charge. Petitioner should not be able to pursue one strategy, abandon the strategy and then 
pursue a contempt claim. 
The inconsistent Order and contempt finding by Judge Kouris offends the prudential 
practice of refusing to reopen matters that have already been decided. To sustain Judge Kouris's 
orders leaves Respondent in a situation in which the parties' stipulation is voided and 
Respondent is punished while he has been in compliance. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
AS EVIDENCE A STATEMENT MADE IN 
SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS. THE TRIAL 
COURT FURTHER ERRED IN RELYING UPON 
THIS STATEMENT IN DRAWING CON-
CLUSIONS ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF 
THE RESPONDENT. 
Prior to the trial held October 26, 2006, the parties were involved with settlement 
negotiations. Respondent, in explaining his position that a proposal made by the Petitioner was 
not acceptable noted that "the children would suffer" from the settlement proposal. (Petitioner's 
Exhibit 6, Appendix 7). During the trial, the Respondent was asked whether he had sent an e-
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mail letter stating the children would suffer. (Trial Tr. 88-92). The question's context was 
whether Respondent ;,;va;^:^ ; • i.c r\^,>u.i . . / 
answered the question, "no." Petitioner then attempted to introduce the statement contained in 
the settlement letter of the Respondent. 1 1 le Court admitted the statement Lifting the single 
sentence out of the entire letter. (Trial Tr. 93). A second sentence from the same paragraph also 
remained. 
Later, the Court sua sponte questioned the Petitioner regarding the statement. (Trial Tr. 
101-102). The Court's questions and answers are set forth m ihc Statement olTacis. i ne Court 
i •.! • •: iy thai the Respondent's testimony was not credible finding that the Respondent 
had contradicted himself on two occasions. One of the contradictions was the statement from the 
Set t le " 1 ' ii i M ; \ ; 'V ! ] i : 
Rule 408 Utah Rules of Evidence in pertinent part states: 
Evidence of conduct or statements made in 
compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. 
This rule does not require the exclusion of an) 
evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it 
is presented in the course of compromise 
negotiations. This rule also does not require 
exclusion when the evidence is offered for another 
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a 
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or 
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation 
or prosecution. 
In Davidson \ n i n i i * - . 
408. The court stated: 
In order for the exclusionary rule to attach, the party 
seeking to have evidence of offers to compromise or 
statements made in the course thereof excluded 
must show that the discussions in question were 
made in "compromise negotiations" (citations 
omitted). 
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813P.2d@1232. 
In the Davidson situation, the court found the letter admitted into evidence to not have 
been made in compromise negotiations. In the present situation, Petitioner's testimony explains 
that the letter was in response to an offer of the Petitioner and a counter-proposal of the 
Respondent. Petitioner testified that negotiations commenced with a phone message left by 
Respondent. Petitioner and Respondent were under time pressure to reach an agreement (if one 
could be reached) before the trial date. Respondent was with his children at his mother's home 
on a hunting trip. Petitioner acknowledged the statement was an effort to convince the Petitioner 
to accept Respondent's position. 
A statement made in settlement negotiations can be used for purposes of impeachment. 
This impeachment involves use of a prior inconsistent statement. Here, Respondent had not 
made a prior statement that was inconsistent. One and only one statement, the statement in the 
settlement letter was involved. Questions about settlement negotiations cannot be asked and then 
admitted as evidence. 
The purpose of Rule 408, Utah Rules of Evidence, is fostering the settlement and 
compromise of disputes by the parties and providing for open communication in settlement 
negotiations. If questions can be asked about the negotiations and used against a party, the 
purpose of Rule 408 is frustrated. 
The court admitted the statement directly as evidence and not solely evidence of 
impeachment. The court, sua sponte, then asked the questions of the Petitioner. Now, the 
evidence was admitted for purposes of determining whether the Respondent should be held in 
contempt. No exception to the exclusion of settlement negotiations applies to the questions 
asked by the court. 
24 
The court's error in admitting the statement from negotiations was prejudicial. The court 
specilicaiA ;^:;d ;n«; :;.J respondent I.»J ^mruGiL^d m.:^ . . • . ::> 
testimony about the statement in settlement negotiations was the basis for the finding of a 
contradiction b\ Respondent. 
POINT IV 
PETITIONER IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPhD 
FROM MAINTAINING THE BENEFITS OF THE 
ACCOMMODATIONS OF THE PARTIES AND 
PAYMENTS NOT REQUIRED BY THE 
DIVORCE DECREE WHILE CLAIMING 
ADJUSTED CHILD SUPPORT AND OTHER 
AMOI JNTS SHOT IT D H A VF BEEN PAID. 
Utah courts have addressed equitable estoppel in connection with Divorce Decrees on 
estoppel: 
In order to prevail on his theory of estoppel, 
plaintiff must prove that defendant, by her 
representations or actions led plaintiff to believe he 
need not pay alimony or child support, and that 
plaintiff, in reliance upon said representations, 
changed his position to his detriment. In such a 
case, enforcement of the decree creates a hardship 
and injustice to plaintiff and defendant would be 
estopped to deny his own misrepresentations, and 
estopped from claiming unpaid support, 
592 P.2d@ 602-603. 
1956). In Larsen, Appellant claimed that he should not be require to pay back child support 
under circumstances tl lat the 1 lespoi idei it I lad c •! all) disci issed tl ic Appellai it lea \ ii ig I Jtal i b :) 
serve a church mission. The Respondent further requested that the Appellant leave Respondent 
and the parties 
The Court remanded the case for a determination as to whether the Respondent was 
estopped from collecting the back child support. The Court stated: 
In Price v. Price, we held that because the state is 
interested in the child's welfare the parents cannot 
effectively release future payments of support 
money by agreeing with the other to that affect. 
However, this does not mean that a mother may not 
by her actions or representations, or both, preclude 
herself from recovering past due installments of 
support money to reimburse her for any money 
which she has spent for the support of the child. 
Where the father's failure to make such payment 
was induced by her representations or actions and 
where the result of such representations or actions 
the father has been lulled into failing to make such 
payments and into changing his position which he 
would not have been done but for such 
representations, and that as a result of such failure 
to pay and change in his condition it will cause him 
great hardship and injustice if she is allowed to 
enforce the payment of such back installments, she 
may be thereby estopped from enforcing the 
payment of such back installments. So in this case, 
if the trial court finds from the evidence that 
Appellant would not have left his job and gone on a 
mission for his church but for such representations 
that she would not require him to pay such 
installments if he would just leave her and the child 
alone, and the Appellant in reliance upon her 
representations complied with her request and that 
thereafter she supported the child and if such 
payments are collected from him she will be entitled 
to them for her own use and benefit and that it 
would be a great hardship on him to now force him 
to make such payments, she would now be estopped 
from forcing him to pay such past due installments 
as accrued during the time he was filling such 
mission. 
The Court also stated the following regarding the support of the children and its affect on 
estoppel. The Court stated: 
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If the child has been the beneficiary of equivalent 
support and education so that the mother is entitled 
to receive all of said past due support money, she 
should be free to release, compromise or waive that 
which is hers. But if the child has been provided 
bare shelter and food, and denied the benefit of 
proper clothes and dental and medical care, then the 
mother should not be free to waive that portion of 
past due support money that the child has not 
received. The authority cited above hold this 
doctrine is applicable to this extent. It is the 
prerogative of the trial court to determine these facts 
and if he finds that facts exist to justify equitable 
estoppel, he should apply that doctrine and relieve 
the father from payment of the installments to the 
extent indicated... 
In Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (I <tah 1985). the Court in addressing an obligation of a 
stepfather to provide supper: .....: ..r.„.. ...; .i ;:..:._ .^boning L\, "\e LSioppel musi pro\L ~"..^ 
he detrimentally relied on the actions or representations of the party to be estopped. 
In the present case, n^ i'jtmoner actually collected monies not required , v L..^  ; >;vorce 
Decree each year prior to her remarriage. Petitioner remained silent or took no affimiative steps 
to claim back child support while accepting the payments by Respondent. Respondent changed 
his position based on Petitioner's actions paying over $21,000.00 not required by the Divorce 
Decree. It is unjust for Petitioner to retain the benefits of amounts not required by the Divorce 
Decree, pursue claims only for future siipport and after the fact require Respondent t.> nav m ..•--, 
child support. 
POINT V 
PETITIONER WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO CLAIM 
BACK SUPPORT. PETITIONER'S ACTIONS IN 
NOT PURSUING RECOVERY OF PAST 
SUPPORT AND ACCEPTANCE OF PAYMENTS 
NOT REQUIRED BY DIVORCE DECREE 
CONSTITI JTE A WAIVER. 
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Petitioner acknowledges that agreements were reached by the parties regarding numerous 
aspects of the Decree of Divorce. Petitioner acknowledges that she received over $21,000.00 
from Respondent to pay her personal income taxes. (Trial Tr. 60-62). The payment of her taxes 
was no required by the Decree of Divorce. (Trial Tr. 38). 
The courts have addressed the requirements for waiver of provisions of a Decree of 
Divorce. The Utah Supreme court addressed the requirements of waiver in the context of a 
Divorce Decree in Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983). In Hunter, the Court stated the 
requirements for waiver as follows: 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. To constitute a waiver, there must be 
an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge 
of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. It 
must be distinctly made, although it may be express 
or implied. 
669 P.2d @ 432. 
Petitioner acknowledged that she decided not to pursue past child support. Petitioner 
pursued a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce that did not mention past child support. (R @ 
59-61). Petitioner accepted over $21,000.00 from Respondent that he was not obligated to pay. 
(Trial Tr. 38). These actions occurred over six years. Petitioner thereby distinctly demonstrated 
her intention to relinquish past support. 
The trial court found "... Petitioner attempted to enforce the Decree of Divorce by setting 
up different mediation dates." Petitioner testified that the discussion about mediation took place 
after her remarriage in November, 2004. (Trial Tr. 55-58). The mediation related to Petitioner 
wanting more future child support than provided by the child support guidelines. (Trial Tr. 55-
58). The Court's finding is clearly erroneous. Petitioner did not attempt by mediation to enforce 
the Decree. 
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Likewise, Petitioner did not seek to exchange financial records for past child support 
purposes until September, 2006. I 'etitionei ' s intent ii i pursuing a Petitio 11 :> IN lodify Decree of 
Divorce resulted in a stipulation that was complied with. Petitioner waived any right to claim 
past amounts. 
POIN i \ * 
A l lOKJNhA 'b t t t b AKi: . \U 1 K l U " : K A H L E 
p v TUT: PPTTTJOVFR 
The Decree of Divorce provides that if any party shall be found in contempt of any 
pro\ isions of an) Oi dei of 1:1 lis Com n it, that pai !:> shall be responsible foi paying reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs for the enforcement thereof. (Appendix 3, R (cv 46). As provided 
throughout mis unci , KespoiRun: < u. *'* •< > .^.|11. . . 
condition for an award of attorney's fees is not met. 
'I he Court also erred in awarding : _;:i.. :.jr 
subsequent to the trial. Petitioner's counsel was not required to provide any accounting for the 
claimed fees. The necessin o\ these fees is subject to question. I he questions arise from the 
position taken by the Petitioner regarding the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order, Objection to two sets of proposed findings, conclusions and order was required. 
Ultimately, Petitioner determined Respondent's suggested Findings, Conclusions and 
Order to be correct with the one exception of the dispute of the amount of monthly child support. 
At the hearing on December 16, 2006, this issue was determined in the Respondent's favor. 
Under these circumstances, the reasonableness and need for these fees is in question. The Court 
did mil ii'iiiiiic IVlilminT to i <«111111's wifli flir infiiinTiinifs of suhmitlini', dnnimentiitinn of ilir 
amount, reasonableness and need for the services. The Petitioner did not comply with the Order 
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from Trial Held October 26, 2006 and Objection Hearing Held December 18, 2006. (Appendix 
1, R @ 219). Petitioner did not provide an Affidavit of Attorney's Fees for the $1,386.89. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent requests that this Court reverse the Order from Trial Held October 26, 2006 
and Objection Hearing Held December 18, 2006. Respondent should not be held in contempt of 
court, should not be responsible for prior child support, Christmas and clothing funds, taxes for 
Petitioner for tax years after her remarriage or attorney's fees. If the Order is not reversed, 
Respondent should be credited for amounts paid for Petitioner's taxes against any amount found 
owing. 
:th Dated this 15in day of May, 2006. 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES 
Bruce L. Richards 
Attorney for Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 15 day of May, 2007, a copy of Appellant's Brief was mailed 
via First Class Mail, postage-prepaid to: 
David J. Friel 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2875 South Decker Lake Dr. #225 
Salt Lake City, UT 84119 
^ ^ 
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APPENDIX 1 
ORDER FROM TRIAL HELD OCTOBER 26, 
2006 AND OBJECTION HEARING HELD 
DECEMBER 18, 2006 
JANUARY 9,2007 
mm-s m" ~ ' 
FILED BY 
Davi-iJ F-.-;e.l 
rney lor Petitioner 
L< S. Decker Lake Drive, trZZb 
i ^keCity, UT 84119. 
jne: (301) 975-1122 
Facsimile: (o01) 975-8611 
Bar No. 6225 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT r.r>[ !PT 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA ANDERSON, ) 
(f.k.a. I inda LaRee Thompson), ] 
v e i i i i : : KJ. , ] 
VS.
 t 
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON, 
Respondent. 
I ORDER FROM TRIAL HELD 
I OCTOBER 26, 2006 AND OBJECTION 
I HEARING HELD DECEMBER 18, 2006 
) Civil No. 994300102DA 
) J l 
A bench trial 'was held in the.above-entitled ma'iei :*-] October 26, 2006 beiore 
Ji idge'Mark S. \ - '<"• • > ^ < > • > 
Petitioner, Linda Anderson, was present and represented .by counsel Dpvki ! l- r iel. 
Respondent, Glei 11 i 1 II 101 i ipsoi i, was pi esei itai id represented by.counsel, b; 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law previously entered in the i m " -T, 
tl le Gout I: i low entei s tf le i ollowing: 
1 
002 
ORDER 
1. The Court previously found that the parties' actions created a substantial and 
material change in circumstances and it is ordered that both parties be responsible one-
half each for the non-school extracurricular activities of the minor children. 
2. The Court orders that Respondent will claim the second and fourth oldest 
children on his taxes and Petitioner will claim the oldest and third oldest children on her 
taxes. 
3. Respondent is given no credit for his payments on the voluntary insurance 
that he is providing and covering the children with since the Decree ordered Petitioner to 
keep insurance on the children. 
4 . The Court previouslyfound that Respondent is in contempt of Court for not 
following the Decree of Divorce at paragraph No's 9, 10, and 20. Therefore, the Court 
enters total judgments against the Respondent in the amount of $44,311.00. 
5. Breaking down into specific categories "the .$44,311.00 judgment, the 
Petitioner is awarded a judgment against the Respondent in the amount of $2,480.00 for 
the 2004 taxes that Respondent should have paid of Petitioner's. 
6. The Petitioner is awarded judgment against the Respondent in the amount 
of $1,726.50 for the non-school extracurricular activities that should have been paid by the 
Respondent after October, 2004. All non-school extracurricular activities proportionate 
one-half (!4) payments have been made by Respondent prior to October, 2004. 
2 
00220 
) petitioner is awarded ji idgment in tf ie amount of .$4,300.00 an? :n^t the 
Respondent due to his non compliance with paragraph No. 10 in the Decree of Divorce. 
Respondent.due to \ lis non compliai ice with paragraph No. 20 in the Decree of .Divorce. 
•  F 'etitioi ie i • is av /ai ciecl j i w-..\:\>\ ciya;:ibi t ^ spohi.b.u : \ ;ne • amount 
$31,997.11 for non compliance of paragraph 'No. 9 of.the Decree of Divorce regarding the 
automatic adjustment of cl iild support based onthe gross receipts of the Respondent per 
X L - . r \ _ _ i r-» • 
LI i t : L v 'i'-i -:\-i « )« s ! ! v . »• -
1 Attorney fees are justified and necessary and reasonable and Petitioner is 
.aWcjfr , * . ' . ' ' -• ' w • t v / v o\jdiii.>i. tnt- KtjsuunuL'fiL ruLi^oiiC: s counr.e! vvill 
prepare an affidavit of attorney fees incurred by the Petitioner. 
1 ;i;op..,u _ i . ; has beei i fom id in contempt of Court and if found in contempt 
again the Couu win consider jail time. Resp^ndr rx • ..'-••, ^ ^ ; :'.. •. . -..*> n 
found in contempt of Court and jail or a fine could-be imposed and the Court expects the 
Respc • ' ' •• •" de-
12. Beginning Januai y, 2007 Respondent's monthly child .si ipport obligation to 
Petitioi lei v 'ill be $2,5 16.08 based i ipor i W ie automat ic ad justment of o\ iild suppoi t as per 
the Decree of Divorce. This is based on Respondent's 2004 and .2005 gross receipts. 
3 
I f f ' 
Beginning 2007 Respondent will provide his 2006 gross receipts compared to 2005 gross 
receipts so the parties may calculate if there needs to be an adjustment increase to the 
base child support amount. The base child support amount is $2,061.00. The gross 
receipts from Respondent will be given to Petitioner for 2006 (and each year thereafter) 
so Petitioner can calculate the child support adjustment in accordance with paragraph 9 
of the parties' Decree of Divorce. Petitioner will have fifteen (15) days to calculate the 
adjustment, if any. Respondent will have fifteen (15) days to respond to Petitioner's 
figures. If the parties agree, the figures may be adjusted automatically with the increase 
or decrease. If the parties do not agree, no adjustment can be made without a Court 
hearing. The monthly child support amount due from Respondent to Petitioner will not be 
adjusted below $2,061.00. If Respondent has paid less than the adjusted amount, 
Respondent shall pay the underpayment with the next month's child support payment. If 
Respondent has paid more than the adjusted amount, the Respondent shall subtract the 
over-payment from the next month's child support payment. If any judgment amount 
remains enforceable, the overpayment may be subtracted from the judgment amount. 
4 
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13. All provisions of the Decree of Divorce not expressed changed or modified 
in the action will remain in full force and effect. 
DATED this ^ day of ^ W o - V ^ , 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form aftdHsantcrrt: 
Bruce L. Richards 
Attorney for Respondent 
Judge Mark S. Kouris 
Third District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be sent by U.S. Mail, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on this 3-S> day of tec^rrg^_2006/to: 
C AndersonL ord3 
Bruce L. Richards, Esq. 
P.O. Box 25786 
Salt Lake City, UT 84125 
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APPENDIX 2 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
JANUARY 9,2007 
David J Friel 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2875 S. Decker Lake Drive, #225 
Salt Lake City, UT 84119 
Telephone: (801) 975-1122 
Facsimile: (801) 975-8611 
Bar No. 6225 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA ANDERSON, ) 
(f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson), ) 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON, 
Respondent. 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 994300102DA 
) Judge: Mark S. Kouris 
A bench trial was held before Judge Mark S. Kouris of the Third District Court on 
October 26, 2006. Subsequently, an Objection hearing was held on December 18,2006. 
Petitioner, Linda Anderson, was present and represented by counsel, David J. Friel. 
Respondent, Glenn Thompson, was present and represented by counsel, Bruce Richards. 
Based upon the testimony of witnesses and the exhibits received by the Court and the 
argument of counsel, the Court entered the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that a materia! and substantia! change of 
circumstances has taken place due to the actions of the parties since entry of the Decree 
1 
T H
» » « » T t i c T c t » r . T 0 0 t u 
mm-s
 mH:dl 
f ivEDey 
0 0 9 1 c ; 
of Divorce in April, 1999. The Court finds that the parties left out several terms from the 
Decree of Divorce because they had not thought through in detail the specific agreements 
made prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The Court finds that the parties' verbal 
agreement entered into a few months after the Decree was signed was that the parties 
would split the costs of all non-school extra curricular activities one-half each. This was 
a material and substantial change in circumstances and was abided to by the parties for 
approximately five and a half years. The Court finds that the parties' actions created a 
substantial change in circumstances and it is appropriate that both parties be responsible 
one-half each for the non-school extra curricular activities of the minor children from the 
time the parties made the agreement. 
2. Respondent has been enjoying all of thelax exemptionsforthe four 
minor-children •from "the i ime-of"ihe entry -of ihe Decree of Divorce through "2005. 
Respondent stepped to the plate and paid the amount due on Petitioner's taxes through 
2003 so that Respondent could keep all of the exemptions. Petitioner testified that the 
agreement of the parties was that Respondent would pay all of Petitioner's tax debt above 
and beyond $1,200 per month. The Court finds that in 2004 Petitioner had a tax debt of 
$2,480 that she paid and Respondent did not contribute to or pay. For 2005, ihe 
Respondent, in accordance with the Decree of Divorce, claimed theiour dependants. 
Petitioner also claimed two dependants. The contributions that Respondent made to 
Petitioner's tax debt were made so that Respondent could keep the exemptions. 
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3. The Court finds that the insurance coverage of the minor children by 
the Respondent was not requested by the Petitioner nor required by the Decree of 
Divorce. Respondent is given no credit for his payments on the voluntary insurance that 
he is providing and covering the children with. 
4. The Courtfindsthatthe parties have different approaches to parenting 
in relation to the vehicle driven by the minor child. Respondent feels that the child should 
pay for the truck and its expenses and Petitioner feels that school is more important and 
the minor child should not be forced to pay for the expenses for the vehicle on his own. 
No monies are awarded to Petitioner on this issue. Any future payments made by 
Petitioner on this issue will be from her own funds. 
5. The Courtfmds that Respondent has not been abiding bylhe Decree 
of-Divorce-since-2004-and^espondenthasadmitted1hathehas~notb"een~paying"'for"ane-
half of the non-school extra curricular activities of the children since November .2004. 
6. The Courtfinds that paragraph No. 10 of the Decree of Divorce is still 
in full "force and effect and that a judgment should be entered against the Respondent and 
in favor of the Petitioner. 
7. The Court findslhat paragraph No. 20 of the Decree of Divorce has 
not been complied with and that Petitioner did not have access to tax records held by the 
Respondent and that a judgment should enter against the Respondent in favor of the 
Petitioner. 
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8. The Court finds that the Decree of Divorce speaks for itself in that the 
parties projected that additional child support should be paid from the Respondent to the 
Petitioner over and above the child support guidelines. Petitioner is to receive a judgment 
against Respondent for those increases that have not been paid. 
9. The Court finds that Petitioner's testimony is completely credible and 
truthful and is corroborated by her testimony, exhibits, and those issues brought forth at 
trial. 
10. The Court finds that Respondent's testimony is not credible and he 
has contradicted his own testimony on two separate occasions. The Court finds that 
Respondent's answers are not corroborated and that his explanations are not credible. 
11. The Court finds that Petitioner waited a long period of timelo bring 
this action before the Court and the Court finds that there isno determent inihe delay of 
time because Petitioner has reasonable explanations as to why she waited so long. The 
Court finds that Petitioner attempted to enforce the Decree of Divorce by setting up 
different mediation dates. The Court finds that Respondent refused to attend the 
meditations scheduled by Petitioner. The Court finds that it was impossible for the 
Petitioner to enforce the Decree of Divorce because the financial records were to be 
turned over by June 1st of each year. 
12. The Court finds that Respondent is in contempt of Court for not 
following the Decree of Divorce at paragraph No's 9, 10, and 20. The Court finds that 
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Respondent knew there was an order of the Court and had the ability and capacity to 
comply with the orders of the Court. The Court finds that Respondent intentionally chose 
not to follow the orders of the Court. The Court enters total judgements against the 
Respondent in the amount of $44,311.00. 
13. Itemizing into specific categories for the $44,311.00 judgment, the 
Court finds that Petitioner is awarded a judgment against the Respondent in the amount 
of $2,480.00 for the 2004 taxes that Respondent should have paid of Petitioner's. 
14. The Court finds that Petitioner is awarded judgment against the 
Respondent in the amount of $1,726.50 for the non-school extra curricular activities that 
should have been paid by the Respondent. 
15. The Court finds that Petitioner is awarded judgement in the amount 
of$4,300.00 against the Respondent dueto hisnon compliance with paragraph No.~10 in 
the Decree of Divorce. 
16. The Court finds that Petitioner is awarded judgement in the amount 
of $3,808.00 against the Respondent due to his non compliance with paragraph No. 20 in 
the Decree of Divorce. 
17. The Court finds that Petitioner is awarded judgment against 
Respondent in the amount $31,997.11 for non compliance of paragraph No. 9 of the 
Decree of Divorce regarding the automatic adjustment of child support based on the gross 
receipts of the Respondent in excess of the previous year's gross receipts. 
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18. The Court finds that attorney fees are justified and necessary and 
reasonable and Petitioner is awarded attorney fees of $7,652.97 against the Respondent. 
Petitioner's counsel will prepare an affidavit of attorney fees incurred by the Petitioner. 
THEREFORE, BASED UPON THE FINDINGS OF FACT PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED, 
THE COURT HEREBY ENTERS THE FOLLOWING: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that from this point forward Petitioner will claim the 
oldest and third oldest on her taxes as exemptions and the Respondent will claim the 
second and youngest child on his taxes. 
2. The Court concludes that if the Respondent is found in contempt of Court 
again the Court will consider jail time. Respondent must understand that he has been 
fourrdin contempt of Court and jail or a fine could be imposed and the Court expects the 
Respondent to follow the orders of the Court. 
3. Beginning January, 2007 Respondent's monthly child support obligation to 
Petitioner will be $2,516.08 based upon the automatic adjustment of child support as per 
the Decree of Divorce. This is based on Respondent's 2004 and 2005 gross receipts. 
Beginning 2007 Respondent will provide his 2006 gross receipts compared to 2005 gross 
receipts so the parties may calculate if there needs to be an adjustment increase to the 
base child support amount. The base child support amount is $2,061.00. The gross 
receipts from Respondent will be given to Petitioner for 2006 (and each year thereafter) 
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so Petitioner can calculate the child support adjustment in accordance with paragraph 9 
of the parties' Decree of Divorce. Petitioner will have fifteen (15) days to calculate the 
adjustment, if any. Respondent will have fifteen (15) days to respond to Petitioner's 
figures. If the parties agree, the figures may be adjusted automatically with the-increase 
or decrease. If the parties do not agree, no adjustment can be made without a Court 
hearing. The monthly child support amount due from Respondent to Petitioner will not be 
adjusted below $2,061.00. If Respondent has paid less than the adjusted amount, 
Respondent shall pay the underpayment with the next month's child support payment. If 
Respondent has paid more than the adjusted amount, the Respondent shall subtract the 
over-payment from the next month's child support payment. If any judgment amount 
remains enforceable, the overpayment may be subtractedirom the judgment amount. 
-4. Alhprovisionsofthe Decree of Divorce not expressly changed or modified in 
Ihis action will remain in full force and effect. 
DATED this ^ day of ^ > ^ ^ n ,,£eefr 
BYTHECJ3URT: 
Judge Mark S. Kouris 
Third District Court 
Approved as to fornr\and content 
Bruce L. Richards "^ 
Attornev for Resoondent 
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APPENDIX 3 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
APRIL 20,1999 
MICHELLE CLAIRE TACK (#6044) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
10150 South Centennial Parkway 
Suite #400 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 572-8892 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
LINDA LaREE THOMPSON, ) 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) ~ 
civil NO. q q ^ f t n J o Q . 
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON, ) Judge: 
Respondent. ) 
—ooOoo— 
This matter having been submitted to the Court on the basis of a stipulation and property 
settlement signed by both parties, and the Court having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, it is therefor: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. That the Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Respondent, 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties, and said Decree to 
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become final, and absolute and irrevocable upon being signed by the Court and entered by the clerk. 
2. There are four minor children bom as issue of this marriage, to wit: TRAVIS GLENN 
THOMPSON (d.o.b. 1/13/90), DARCIE LINDA THOMPSON (d.o.b. 7/29/92), LYNDSIE LaREE 
THOMPSON (d.o.b. 7/27/94), and COLE HUNTER THOMPSON (d.o.b. 3/6/96). 
3. That the parties are both fit and proper persons to be awarded the care, custody and 
control of the minor children and therefore the parties should be awarded joint legal custody with 
the Petitioner being granted primary physical custody. The parties shall work together to resolve 
issues involving the children, however the Petitioner as custodial parent shall make the final 
decision. 
4. The Respondent shall be granted reasonable and liberal visitation with the minor 
children, with the minimum to be as detailed in §30-3-35 of the Utah Code. The Respondent shall 
be awarded visitation on alternate weekends with at least one additional contact midweek. 
5. The Respondent shall be awarded holiday visitation in odd numbered years for 
Memorial Day, July 24th, and Thanksgiving and in even numbered years for Easter, July 4th, and 
Labor Day. The Christmas holiday shall be divided in such a way as to allow the children to be at 
home with the Petitioner overnight on Christmas Eve until they are of an age when Santa Claus is 
no longer a major factor. In odd numbered years, the Petitioner shall have the children Christmas 
Eve day through Christmas Day at 5:00 p.m. and the Respondent shall have the children on 
Christmas Day from 5:00 p.m. In even numbered years, the Respondent shall have the children on 
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Christmas Eve from 5:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. and again on Christmas Day from 12:00 noon, with 
the Petitioner having the children from 10:00 p.m. Christmas Eve until Christmas Day at 12:00 
noon. 
6. The Respondent shall be granted visitation for each child's birthday from 5:00 p.m. 
on the actual birthday if said day is a weekday. If the birthday is a weekend day during the 
Respondent's regular scheduled visitation, then he shall have the entire weekend subject to the 
Petitioner having visitation on the actual birthday from 5:00 p.m. If the birthday is a weekend day 
and is not during the Respondent's regular scheduled visitation, then he shall have visitation on the 
actual birthday from 5:00 p.m. The party exercising birthday visitation shall have the option to also 
include the parties' other children in said birthday visitation. 
7. Both parties shall have reasonable blocks of visitation time during the summer 
vacation period and shall have the option to travel with the children with reasonable notice to the 
other party. With the exception of vacation and travel time the parties shall continue to follow the 
regular visitation schedule as detailed herein. 
8. Should either party need child care during their respective periods of time with the 
children they shall give the other party the first option to provide such care. Neither party shall, 
however, be required to adjust their individual plans in order to accommodate the other party's 
schedule and should either party fail to provide such care after agreeing to do so they shall be 
responsible for the actual costs incurred for substitute care. 
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9. The Respondent shall pay child support for the parties' minor children in the amount 
of $1,000.00 per month. The parties' recognize that said amount is less than as provided by the 
guidelines set forth in the Utah Code and have agreed on said amount based upon the entire divorce 
settlement. Upon the termination of alimony the base child support amount shall be automatically 
adjusted to an amount consistent with the guidelines set forth in the Utah Code. The Respondent's 
monthly child support obligation shall be automatically increased each year by .7% (.007) of the 
Respondent's gross business receipts in excess of the previous year's gross business receipts (1998 
gross business receipts determined to be $300,000.00) in order to preserve the ratio of monthly child 
support to Respondent's yearly gross business receipts. 
10. The Respondent shall make the following payments to the Petitioner for the benefit 
of the children in addition to child support: 
a. One thousand dollars ($ 1,000.00) yearly by December 1 st for Christmas with 
this sum to be matched by the Petitioner. 
b. Seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) yearly by August 1 st for school clothing 
and supplies with this sum to be matched by the Petitioner. Said funds may be maintained in a 
separate account and spent over the course of the year. 
c. Five hundred dollars ($500.00) yearly by May 1st for Spring and Summer 
clothing with this sum to be matched by the Petitioner. Again, said funds may be maintained and 
budgeted over the course of the year. 
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d. All costs for non-school extra-curricular activities and lessons for the mmor 
children (baseball, Softball, basketball, soccer, golf, music, swimming, etc..) along with costs of all 
equipment, apparel and travel associated with participation therein. 
e. One-half of the costs for an agreed-upon birthday party for each child yearly. 
11. Respondent shall be responsible for expenses for the children's missions and 
reasonable college education with some contribution from each respective child. 
12. The Respondent shall not be subject to Universal Income Withholding pursuant to 
§62A-11-403 of the Utah Code unless he should become delinquent in his obligations under this 
agreement. 
13. The parties shall exchange income information and verification no later than June 1 st 
of each year. The Petitioner will also provide Respondent with documentation of her matching funds 
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 15 above no later than June 1st each year. 
14. The Respondent shall be allowed to claim the minor children as dependents for tax 
purposes with this division of exemptions to be re-evaluated whenever child support is re-evaluated 
or modified. 
15. The Petitioner shall continue to provide the children's medical insurance and shall 
pay the premiums thereon. 
16. The parties shall each pay one-half QA) of any and all routine medical, optical and/or 
dental expenses incurred for the benefit of the parties' minor children which are not covered by 
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insurance, including deductibles and co-pays. Financial responsibility for any catastrophic expenses 
which might be incurred for the benefit of the minor children shall be determined based on the 
parties' respective financial positions at that point in time. 
17. That should work and/or training related child care be required at any point, the 
parties agree to divide this expense equally. 
18. The Respondent shall be required to pay the premiums thereon and maintain in effect 
at least $800,000.00 of life insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor children with the Petitioner 
named as Trustee of all proceeds of said policy. Further, the Respondent shall be required, should 
he be able to obtain even limited disability insurance, to maintain disability insurance for the benefit 
of the minor children and the Petitioner as long as he is subject to an alimony and/or child support 
obligation. 
19. The Respondent shall pay the Petitioner $3,100.00 monthly as and for spousal support 
for a period of twelve years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter. The 
Respondent's support obligation is based upon the assumption of the parties that the Petitioner will 
remarry within this twelve year period and therefore a continuation of alimony beyond this twelve 
year period shall be considered should the Petitioner not be re-married at the termination of said 
period. The Respondent's spousal support obligation shall terminate upon the Petitioner's death, 
remarriage, or cohabitation and such a termination shall automatically trigger a recalculation of the 
Respondent's child support obligation. 
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20. The Respondent shall also pay the Petitioner a reasonable annual "cost of living" 
increase in alimony which shall consist of one percent (1%) of Respondent's gross business receipts 
for the previous year over $300,000.00. This additional amount of alimony shall be paid in one lump 
sum no later than June 1st of each year. 
21. That the Petitioner shall be awarded the parties' marital residence located at 638 
Country Club, Stansbury Park, Utah, and shall assume and pay all expenses related thereto, including 
the mortgage, taxes, and utilities, and shall hold the Respondent harmless thereon. 
22. The Respondent shall execute a quit-claim deed transferring any and all interest he 
may have in the marital residence to the Petitioner. 
23. That the Respondent shall be awarded the business TOOELE VALLEY SPINE 
CENTER along with all property associated therewith as well as the commercial real property 
purchased for said business, and he shall assume and pay all expenses related thereto and shall hold 
the Petitioner harmless thereon. 
24. The Petitioner shall if needed execute a quit-claim deed transferring any and all 
interest she may have in the business and business property to the Respondent. 
25. That the Respondent shall be awarded fifty percent (50%) « approximately $5,000 — 
of the parties' cumulative IRA accounts, fifty percent (50%) -- approximately $4,200 - of the 
parties' cumulative savings, and his personal effects and property. 
26. That the Petitioner shall be awarded fifty percent (50%) - approximately $5,000 -
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of the parties' cumulative IRA accounts, fifty percent (50%) ~ approximately $4,200 — of the 
parties' cumulative savings, her personal effects and property, and the balance of the marital property 
in/at the marital residence. 
27. That the Respondent shall be awarded the Bobcat automobile and shall assume and 
pay all expenses related thereto including insurance and shall hold the Petitioner harmless thereon. 
28. That the Petitioner shall be awarded the 1994 Suburban and shall assume and pay all 
expenses related thereto including insurance and shall hold the Respondent harmless thereon. 
However, the Respondent shall be awarded the right to the reasonable use of said vehicle during his 
visitation periods until he has obtained reliable transportation and the Petitioner shall be granted the 
use of his vehicle during said visitation periods. 
29. That the Respondent shall assume and pay his student loans and also the debt to his 
parents in the approximate amount of $20,000.00 and shall hold the Petitioner harmless thereon. 
30. That the Petitioner shall assume and pay the debt to her parents in the approximate 
amount of $18,000.00 and shall hold the Respondent harmless thereon. 
31. In the event that any outstanding debt or obligation of any kind has been incurred by 
either party other than the debts and obligations set forth and intended above, the party actually 
incurring the debt or obligation shall assume and be solely responsible for paying it and shall hold 
the other party harmless from all claims, obligations, and expenses with respect to said debt. 
32. If this matter is uncontested, the parties' shall each be responsible for one-half of the 
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attorney's fees and costs associated with this action. 
33. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other party any documents 
necessary to implement the provisions to the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
34. If any party should be found to be in contempt of any provisions of any Order of this 
Court, that party shall be responsible for paying reasonable attorney's fees and costs for the 
enforcement thereof. 
DATED t h i s ^ t d a y of April, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form 
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON 
Respondent 
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APPENDIX 4 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
APRIL 20,1999 
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FILED By 
MICHELLE CLAIRE TACK (#6044) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
10150 South Centennial Parkway 
Suite #400 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 572-8892 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA LaREE THOMPSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON, 
Respondent. 
-ooOoo— 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-ooOoo— 
FINDINGS OF FACT & 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. qftY3ftQffl3L 
Judge: 
This matter having been submitted to the Court on the basis of a stipulation and property 
settlement signed by both parties, the Court hereby makes the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That both parties have been actual and bona fide residents of Tooele County, State 
of Utah, for at least the three months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action. 
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2. That LINDA LaREE THOMPSON and GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON were 
married on or about June 12, 1987, in Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and are 
wife and husband. 
3. LINDA LaREE THOMPSON and GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON have been unable 
to resolve their marital problems making continuation of their marriage impossible. 
4. LINDA LaREE THOMPSON should be granted a divorce from GLENN HUNTER 
THOMPSON on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
5. That the parties have entered into a Stipulation and Property Settlement which makes 
a complete and final settlement of all claims and disputes raised by the pleadings on file with the 
Court, including all issues concerning alimony and the division and allocation of their debts and 
property. 
6. There are four minor children bom as issue of this marriage, to wit: TRAVIS GLENN 
THOMPSON (d.o.b. 1/13/90), DARCIE LINDA THOMPSON (d.o.b. 7/29/92), LYNDSIE LaREE 
THOMPSON (d.o.b. 7/27/94), and COLE HUNTER THOMPSON (d.o.b. 3/6/96). 
7. That the parties are both fit and proper persons to be awarded the care, custody and 
control of the minor children and therefore the parties should be awarded joint legal custody with 
the Petitioner being granted primary physical custody. The parties shall work together to resolve 
issues involving the children, however the Petitioner as custodial parent shall make the final 
decision. 
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8. The Respondent shall be granted reasonable and liberal visitation with the minor 
children, with the minimum to be as detailed in §30-3-35 of the Utah Code. The Respondent shall 
be awarded visitation on alternate weekends with at least one additional contact midweek. 
9. The Respondent shall be awarded holiday visitation in odd numbered years for 
Memorial Day, July 24th, and Thanksgiving and in even numbered years for Easter, July 4th, and 
Labor Day. The Christmas holiday shall be divided in such a way as to allow the children to be at 
home with the Petitioner overnight on Christmas Eve until they are of an age when Santa Claus is 
no longer a major factor. In odd numbered years, the Petitioner shall have the children Christmas 
Eve day through Christmas Day at 5:00 p.m. and the Respondent shall have the children on 
Christmas Day from 5:00 p.m. In even numbered years, the Respondent shall have the children on 
Christmas Eve from 5:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. and again on Christmas Day from 12:00 noon, with 
the Petitioner having the children from 10:00 p.m. Christmas Eve until Christmas Day at 12:00 
noon. 
10. The Respondent shall be granted visitation for each child's birthday from 5:00 p.m. 
on the actual birthday if said day is a weekday. If the birthday is a weekend day during the 
Respondent's regular scheduled visitation, then he shall have the entire weekend subject to the 
Petitioner having visitation on the actual birthday from 5:00 p.m. If the birthday is a weekend day 
and is not during the Respondent's regular scheduled visitation, then he shall have visitation on the 
actual birthday from 5:00 p.m. The party exercising birthday visitation shall have the option to also 
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include the parties' other children in said birthday visitation. 
11. Both parties shall have reasonable blocks of visitation time during the summer 
vacation period and shall have the option to travel with the children with reasonable notice to the 
other party. With the exception of vacation and travel time the parties shall continue to follow the 
regular visitation schedule as detailed herein. 
12. Should either party need child care during their respective periods of time with the 
children they shall give the other party the first option to provide such care. Neither party shall, 
however, be required to adjust their individual plans in order to accommodate the other party's 
schedule and should either party fail to provide such care after agreeing to do so they shall be 
responsible for the actual costs incurred for substitute care. 
13. The Respondent shall pay child support for the parties' minor children in the amount 
of $1,000.00 per month. The parties' recognize that said amount is less than as provided by the 
guidelines set forth in the Utah Code and have agreed on said amount based upon the entire divorce 
settlement. Upon the termination of alimony the base child support amount shall be automatically 
adjusted to an amount consistent with the guidelines set forth in the Utah Code. The Respondent's 
monthly child support obligation shall be automatically increased each year by .7% (.007) of the 
Respondent's gross business receipts in excess of the previous year's gross business receipts (1998 
gross business receipts determined to be $300,000.00) in order to preserve the ratio of monthly child 
support to Respondent's yearly gross business receipts. 
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14. The Respondent shall make the following payments to the Petitioner for the benefit 
of the children in addition to child support: 
a. One thousand dollars ($ 1,000.00) yearly by December 1 st for Christmas with 
this sum to be matched by the Petitioner. 
b. Seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) yearly by August 1 st for school clothing 
and supplies with this sum to be matched by the Petitioner. Said funds may be maintained in a 
separate account and spent over the course of the year. 
c. Five hundred dollars ($500.00) yearly by May 1st for Spring and Summer 
clothing with this sum to be matched by the Petitioner. Again, said funds may be maintained and 
budgeted over the course of the year. 
d. All costs for non-school extra-curricular activities and lessons for the minor 
children (baseball, softball, basketball, soccer, golf, music, swimming, etc..) along with costs of all 
equipment, apparel and travel associated with participation therein. 
e. One-half of the costs for an agreed-upon birthday party for each child yearly. 
15. Respondent shall be responsible for expenses for the children's missions and 
reasonable college education with some contribution from each respective child. 
16. The Respondent shall not be subject to Universal Income Withholding pursuant to 
§62A-11-403 of the Utah Code unless he should become delinquent in his obligations under this 
agreement. 
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17. The parties shall exchange income information and verification no later than June 1 st 
of each year. The Petitioner will also provide Respondent with documentation of her matching funds 
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 15 above no later than June 1st each year. 
18. The Respondent shall be allowed to claim the minor children as dependents for tax 
purposes with this division of exemptions to be re-evaluated whenever child support is re-evaluated 
or modified. 
19. The Petitioner shall continue to provide the children's medical insurance and shall 
pay the premiums thereon. 
20. The parties shall each pay one-half (Vi) of any and all routine medical, optical and/or 
dental expenses incurred for the benefit of the parties' minor children which are not covered by 
insurance, including deductibles and co-pays. Financial responsibility for any catastrophic expenses 
which might be incurred for the benefit of the minor children shall be determined based on the 
parties' respective financial positions at that point in time. 
21. That should work and/or training related child care be required at any point, the 
parties agree to divide this expense equally. 
22. The Respondent shall be required to pay the premiums thereon and maintain in effect 
at least $800,000.00 of life insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor children with the Petitioner 
named as Trustee of all proceeds of said policy. Further, the Respondent shall be required, should 
he be able to obtain even limited disability insurance, to maintain disability insurance for the benefit 
6 
of the minor children and the Petitioner as long as he is subject to an alimony and/or child support 
obligation. 
23. The Respondent shall pay the Petitioner $3,100.00 monthly as and for spousal support 
for a period of twelve years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter. The 
Respondent's support obligation is based upon the assumption of the parties that the Petitioner will 
remarry within this twelve year period and therefore a continuation of alimony beyond this twelve 
year period shall be considered should the Petitioner not be re-married at the termination of said 
period. The Respondent's spousal support obligation shall terminate upon the Petitioner's death, 
remarriage, or cohabitation and such a termination shall automatically trigger a recalculation of the 
Respondent's child support obligation. 
24. The Respondent shall also pay the Petitioner a reasonable annual "cost of living" 
increase in alimony which shall consist of one percent (1%) of Respondent's gross business receipts 
for the previous year over $300,000.00. This additional amount of alimony shall be paid in one lump 
sum no later than June 1st of each year. 
25. That the Petitioner shall be awarded the parties' marital residence located at 638 
Country Club, Stansbury Park, Utah, and shall assume and pay all expenses related thereto, including 
the mortgage, taxes, and utilities, and shall hold the Respondent harmless thereon. 
26. The Respondent shall execute a quit-claim deed transferring any and all interest he 
may have in the marital residence to the Petitioner. 
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27. That the Respondent shall be awarded the business TOOELE VALLEY SPE^E 
CENTER along with all property associated therewith as well as the commercial real property 
purchased for said business, and he shall assume and pay all expenses related thereto and shall hold 
the Petitioner harmless thereon. 
28. The Petitioner shall if needed execute a quit-claim deed transferring any and all 
interest she may have in the business and business property to the Respondent. 
29. That the Respondent shall be awarded fifty percent (50%) — approximately $5,000 --
of the parties' cumulative ERA accounts, fifty percent (50%) — approximately $4,200 — of the 
parties' cumulative savings, and his personal effects and property. 
30. That the Petitioner shall be awarded fifty percent (50%) — approximately $5,000 ~ 
of the parties' cumulative IRA accounts, fifty percent (50%) — approximately $4,200 — of the 
parties' cumulative savings, her personal effects and property, and the balance of the marital property 
in/at the marital residence. 
31. That the Respondent shall be awarded the Bobcat automobile and shall assume and 
pay all expenses related thereto including insurance and shall hold the Petitioner harmless thereon. 
32. That the Petitioner shall be awarded the 1994 Suburban and shall assume and pay all 
expenses related thereto including insurance and shall hold the Respondent harmless thereon. 
However, the Respondent shall be awarded the right to the reasonable use of said vehicle during his 
visitation periods until he has obtained reliable transportation and the Petitioner shall be granted the 
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use of his vehicle during said visitation periods. 
33. That the Respondent shall assume and pay his student loans and also the debt to his 
parents in the approximate amount of $20,000.00 and shall hold the Petitioner harmless thereon. 
34. That the Petitioner shall assume and pay the debt to her parents in the approximate 
amount of $18,000.00 and shall hold the Respondent harmless thereon. 
35. In the event that any outstanding debt or obligation of any kind has been incurred by 
either party other than the debts and obligations set forth and intended above, the party actually 
incurring the debt or obligation shall assume and be solely responsible for paying it and shall hold 
the other party harmless from all claims, obligations, and expenses with respect to said debt. 
36. If this matter is uncontested, the parties' shall each be responsible for one-half of the 
attorney's fees and costs associated with this action. 
37. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other party any documents 
necessary to implement the provisions to the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
38. If any party should be found to be in contempt of any provisions of any Order of this 
Court, that party shall be responsible for paying reasonable attorney's fees and costs for the 
enforcement thereof. 
39. The Respondent, GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON, has consented to the Court 
proceeding to grant a Decree of Divorce to the Petitioner consistent with this Stipulation of the 
parties without further notice to him and without his presence and has consented to the waiver of the 
9 
statutory 90-day waiting period. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the court has jurisdiction over the parties to this action, and over the subject 
matter of the action. 
2. That the Petitioner shall be granted a Decree of Divorce, to become absolute, final 
and irrevocable upon entry by the Court. 
3. That the Decree of Divorce shall be granted and entered in accordance with the 
Findings of Fact. 
DATED t h i s ' j ^ d a y of April, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
\ 
Approved as to 
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON 
Respondent 
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APPENDIX 5 
STIPULATION AND PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT 
APRIL 16,1999 
oo f o ^ ?W\S F;i!2: \\ 
FILED b,'-
MICHELLE CLAIRE TACK (#6044) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
10150 South Centennial Parkway 
Suite #400 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 572-8892 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
LINDA LaREE THOMPSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
—ooOoo— 
STIPULATION & PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT 
civil NO. ^ ^ D O l f y x 
Judge: 
The above-named parties hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
1. That the parties acknowledge and agree that continuation of this marriage existing 
between them is no longer possible, and it is in the best interests of the parties hereto that this matter 
before the Court be concluded, and to that end, the parties in contemplation thereof, enter into this 
agreement. Each party acknowledges that the terms of this agreement are not binding upon the Court 
nnn?3 
until the same are approved by the Court, and each party agrees that upon approval by the Court, the 
terms and conditions hereof may be part of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce to be entered by the Court. 
2. That the parties hereby acknowledge and consent to the jurisdiction of this Court and 
consent to a Divorce Decree being issued in accordance with the terms and conditions of this 
stipulation and property settlement. 
3. That both parties have been actual and bona fide residents of Tooele County, State 
of Utah, for at least the three months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action. 
4. That LINDA LaREE THOMPSON and GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON were 
married on or about June 12, 1987, in Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and are 
wife and husband. 
5. LINDA LaREE THOMPSON and GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON have been unable 
to resolve their marital problems making continuation of their marriage impossible. 
6. LINDA LaREE THOMPSON should be granted a divorce from GLENN HUNTER 
THOMPSON on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
7. There are four minor children born as issue of this marriage, to wit: TRAVIS GLENN 
THOMPSON (d.o.b. 1/13/90), DARCIE LINDA THOMPSON (d.o.b. 7/29/92), LYNDSIE LaREE 
THOMPSON (d.o.b. 7/27/94), and COLE HUNTER THOMPSON (d.o.b. 3/6/96). 
8. That the parties are both fit and proper persons to be awarded the care, custody and 
2 
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control of the minor children and therefore the parties should be awarded joint legal custody with 
the Petitioner being granted primary physical custody. The parties shall work together to resolve 
issues involving the children, however the Petitioner as custodial parent shall make the final 
decision. 
9. The Respondent shall be granted reasonable and liberal visitation with the minor 
children, with the minimum to be as detailed in §30-3-35 of the Utah Code. The Respondent shall 
be awarded visitation on alternate weekends with at least one additional contact midweek. 
10. The Respondent shall be awarded holiday visitation in odd numbered years for 
Memorial Day, July 24th, and Thanksgiving and in even numbered years for Easter, July 4th, and 
Labor Day. The Christmas holiday shall be divided in such a way as to allow the children to be at 
home with the Petitioner overnight on Christmas Eve until they are of an age when Santa Claus is 
no longer a major factor. In odd numbered years, the Petitioner shall have the children Christmas 
Eve day through Christmas Day at 5:00 p.m. and the Respondent shall have the children on 
Christmas Day from 5:00 p.m. In even numbered years, the Respondent shall have the children on 
Christmas Eve from 5:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. and again on Christmas Day from 12:00 noon, with 
the Petitioner having the children from 10:00 p.m. Christmas Eve until Christmas Day at 12:00 
noon. 
11. The Respondent shall be granted visitation for each child's birthday from 5:00 p.m. 
on the actual birthday if said day is a weekday. If the birthday is a weekend day during the 
3 
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Respondent's regular scheduled visitation, then he shall have the entire weekend subject to the 
Petitioner having visitation on the actual birthday from 5:00 p.m. If the birthday is a weekend day 
and is not during the Respondent's regular scheduled visitation, then he shall have visitation on the 
actual birthday from 5:00 p.m. The party exercising birthday visitation shall have the option to also 
include the parties' other children in said birthday visitation. 
12. Both parties shall have reasonable blocks of visitation time during the summer 
vacation period and shall have the option to travel with the children with reasonable notice to the 
other party. With the exception of vacation and travel time the parties shall continue to follow the 
regular visitation schedule as detailed herein. 
13. Should either party need child care during their respective periods of time with the 
children they shall give the other party the first option to provide such care. Neither party shall, 
however, be required to adjust their individual plans in order to accommodate the other party's 
schedule and should either party fail to provide such care after agreeing to do so they shall be 
responsible for the actual costs incurred for substitute care. 
14. The Respondent shall pay child support for the parties' minor children in the amount 
of $1,000.00 per month. The parties' recognize that said amount is less than as provided by the 
guidelines set forth in the Utah Code and have agreed on said amount based upon the entire divorce 
settlement. Upon the termination of alimony, the base child support amount shall be automatically 
adjusted to an amount consistent with the guidelines set forth in the Utah Code. The Respondent's 
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monthly child support obligation shall be automatically increased each year by .7% (.007) of the 
Respondent's gross receipts in excess of the previous year's gross business receipts (1998 gross 
receipts determined to be $300,000.00) in order to preserve the ratio of monthly child support to 
Respondent's yearly gross receipts. 
15. The Respondent shall make the following payments to the Petitioner for the benefit 
of the children in addition to child support: 
a. One thousand dollars ($ 1,000.00) yearly by December 1 st for Christmas with 
this sum to be matched by the Petitioner. 
b. Seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) yearly by August 1 st for school clothing 
and supplies with this sum to be matched by the Petitioner. Said funds may be maintained in a 
separate account and spent over the course of the year. 
c. Five hundred dollars ($500.00) yearly by May 1st for Spring and Summer 
clothing with this sum to be matched by the Petitioner. Again, said funds may be maintained and 
budgeted over the course of the year. 
d. All costs for non-school extra-curricular activities and lessons for the minor 
children (baseball, softball, basketball, soccer, golf, music, swimming, etc..) along with costs of all 
equipment, apparel and travel associated with participation therein. 
e. One-half of the costs for an agreed-upon birthday party for each child yearly. 
16. Respondent shall be responsible for expenses for the children's missions and 
5 
reasonable college education with some contribution from each respective child. 
17. The Respondent shall not be subject to Universal Income Withholding pursuant to 
§62A-11-403 of the Utah Code unless he should become delinquent in his obligations under this 
agreement. 
18. The parties shall exchange income information and verification no later than June 1 st 
of each year. The Petitioner will also provide Respondent with documentation of her matching funds 
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 15 above no later than June 1st each year. 
19. The Respondent shall be allowed to claim the minor children as dependents for tax 
purposes with this division of exemptions to be re-evaluated whenever child support is re-evaluated 
or modified. 
20. The Petitioner shall continue to provide the children's medical insurance and shall 
pay the premiums thereon. 
21. The parties shall each pay one-half (Vi) of any and all routine medical, optical and/or 
dental expenses incurred for the benefit of the parties' minor children which are not covered by 
insurance, including deductibles and co-pays. Financial responsibility for any catastrophic expenses 
which might be incurred for the benefit of the minor children shall be determined based on the 
parties' respective financial positions at that point in time. 
22. That should work and/or training related child care be required at any point, the 
parties agree to divide this expense equally. 
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23. The Respondent shall be required to pay the premiums thereon and maintain in effect 
at least $800,000.00 of life insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor children with the Petitioner 
named as Trustee of all proceeds of said policy. Further, the Respondent shall be required, should 
he be able to obtain even limited disability insurance, to maintain disability insurance for the benefit 
of the minor children and the Petitioner as long as he is subject to an alimony and/or child support 
obligation. 
24. The Respondent shall pay the Petitioner $3,100.00 monthly as and for spousal support 
for a period of twelve years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter. The 
Respondent's support obligation is based upon the assumption of the parties that the Petitioner will 
remarry within this twelve year period and therefore a continuation of alimony beyond this twelve 
year period shall be considered should the Petitioner not be re-married at the termination of said 
period. The Respondent's spousal support obligation shall terminate upon the Petitioner's death, 
remarriage, or cohabitation and such a termination shall automatically trigger a recalculation of the 
Respondent's child support obligation. 
25. The Respondent shall also pay the Petitioner a reasonable annual "cost of living" 
increase in alimony which shall consist of one percent (1%) of Respondent's gross business receipts 
for the previous year over $300,000.00. This additional amount of alimony shall be paid in one lump 
sum no later than June 1st of each year. 
26. That the Petitioner shall be awarded the parties' marital residence located at 638 
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Country Club, Stansbury Park, Utah, and shall assume and pay all expenses related thereto, including 
the mortgage, taxes, and utilities, and shall hold the Respondent harmless thereon. 
27. The Respondent shall execute a quit-claim deed transferring any and all interest he 
may have in the marital residence to the Petitioner. 
28. That the Respondent shall be awarded the business TOOELE VALLEY SPINE 
CENTER along with all property associated therewith as well as the commercial real property 
purchased for said business, and he shall assume and pay all expenses related thereto and shall hold 
the Petitioner harmless thereon. 
29. The Petitioner shall if needed execute a quit-claim deed transferring any and all 
interest she may have in the business and business property to the Respondent. 
30. That the Respondent shall be awarded fifty percent (50%) -- approximately $5,000 — 
of the parties' cumulative IRA accounts, fifty percent (50%) — approximately $4,200 — of the 
parties' cumulative savings, and his personal effects and property. 
31. That the Petitioner shall be awarded fifty percent (50%) — approximately $5,000 --
of the parties' cumulative IRA accounts, fifty percent (50%) — approximately $4,200 — of the 
parties' cumulative savings, her personal effects and property, and the balance of the marital property 
in/at the marital residence. 
32. That the Respondent shall be awarded the Bobcat automobile and shall assume and 
pay all expenses related thereto including insurance and shall hold the Petitioner harmless thereon. 
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33. That the Petitioner shall be awarded the 1994 Suburban and shall assume and pay all 
expenses related thereto including insurance and shall hold the Respondent harmless thereon. 
However, the Respondent shall be awarded the right to the reasonable use of said vehicle during his 
visitation periods until he has obtained reliable transportation and the Petitioner shall be granted the 
use of his vehicle during said visitation periods. 
34. That the Respondent shall assume and pay his student loans and also the debt to his 
parents in the approximate amount of $20,000.00 and shall hold the Petitioner harmless thereon. 
35. That the Petitioner shall assume and pay the debt to her parents in the approximate 
amount of $18,000.00 and shall hold the Respondent harmless thereon. 
36. In the event that any outstanding debt or obligation of any kind has been incurred by 
either party other than the debts and obligations set forth and intended above, the party actually 
incurring the debt or obligation shall assume and be solely responsible for paying it and shall hold 
the other party harmless from all claims, obligations, and expenses with respect to said debt. 
37. If this matter is uncontested, the parties' shall each be responsible for one-half of the 
attorney's fees and costs associated with this action. 
3 8. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other party any documents 
necessary to implement the provisions to the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
39. If any party should be found to be in contempt of any provisions of any Order of this 
9 
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Court, that party shall be responsible for paying reasonable attorney's fees and costs for the 
enforcement thereof. 
40. The Respondent, GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON, hereby consents to the Court 
proceeding to grant a Decree of Divorce to the Petitioner consistent with this Stipulation of the 
parties without further notice to him and without his presence and consents to the waiver of the 
statutory 90-day waiting period. 
DATED this J 5 _ day of April, 1999. 
UM KUU 
LINDA LaREE THOMPSON 
Petitioner 
S^jp-u. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this V3> day of April, 1999. 
My Commission Expires: c2J £^£^/QSD 
L^kJL. 
NOTARY PUBLIC i 
tYNN&JQHNSGN ; 
562 N Main Box 720 *. 
Tooele, Utah 84074 t 
MyOsnmilss!onex0taOGiaM21,aoOO i 
State of Utah \ 
Notary Public 
Residing m*xCDcJl& County 
Hg£L 
DATED this/,3day of April, 1999. 
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON 
Respondent 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this l^Tday of April, 1999. j 
My Commission Expires: cSH O c J ^ O O 
>A 
NO FARY PUBLIC 
LYr,NE JOHNSON 
5S2 N M i n Box 720 
^ Toooca, Utah 84074 
My Commission Expires October 21,2000
 v 
Stat© of Utah v' 
Notary Public 
Residing i rPbCO^^County 
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APPENDIX 6 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
WORKSHEET 
APRIL 16,1999 
IN THE ~TlVtr(i 
"Tooele, 
Luvcki UxfiaelKprxypKy^ 
vs. 
C^ terM\ UujfeTffafopsax 
DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ' ' r 
HI. i
—' L | __j£^ 
f'111 LD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHE] 
(SOLE CUSTOQY AND PATERNITY) 
c iv i l NO. JjELtf&&.\£[L_ 
MOTHER FATHER 
f 1. Enter the > of natural and adopted children of this 
mother- and father for whom support 1B CO be awarded. 
/////////// 
/////////// 
/////////// 
/////////// 
COMBINED 
L-
?,i. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly 
Income. P.efer zz Instructions for definition of 
income. 
| 0 , 0 0 0 
?h. Enter previously ordered alimony t h a t i& a c t u a l l y 
(Do not enter alimony ordered for t h i s c a s e ) . Hpaid, 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not 
enter obligations ordered for the children in Line 1) 
/////////// 
milium 
milium 
minimi 
imiimi nullum 
uumuu 
2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the 
Children in Present Home Worksheet for either parent. 
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the 
Adjusted Gross Income for child support purposes. 
milium i/i/ii/i/i 
(o,ooO jo.erc 
4 . Take the C0M3IJJED f igure i n l i n e 3 and the number 
of ch i ldren in Line 1 t o the Support Table . Find the 
Base Combined Support Obl iga t ion . Enter i t here. 
/ / / / / / / / / / / IIIIIIIUII 
minimi 
minimi 
minimi 
minimi P,o-so 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 
3 by the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3* e>% tco< / / / / / / / / / / / IIIIIIIIIII 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain 
each parent's share of the Base Support Obligation, 
\$ 
o- 5,050 
IIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIII 
7. SASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6 
for the Obligor Parent or enter the amount from the Low Incorap 
Table. 2,0*50 
Which parens Is the obl igor? Mother (v) Father 
i. 
M. 
Is the support award the same as t h e g u i d e l i n e amount in l i n e 7? ( )Yes (M No 
If NO, enter the amount ordered: $ l,oCOBoo , and answer number 10. 
What were the reasons staLi iJ 1
 i he Court fci 1 In* d e v i a t i o n ? (S) property se t t l ement 
( ) excess ive debts of the marriage 
' ( ) absence of need of the c u s t o d i a l parent 
CK^ \rV ^aippor+ -lb comply' osm. g«3frj*oy Qiva.#& CL@&\ rwv cborite -to tfpatfai fu^pfr. 
rney Bar Nu, CPOH^ f ) E l e c t r o n i c f i l l in {^) Manual f i l i n g 
10/94 00024 
APPENDIX 7 
PETITIONER'S EXHIBIT 6 
SETTLEMENT LETTER 
OCTOBER 26,2006 
litufeu 
mm 
If aueeeirafwl in \mmng child wijipun. ultimately the children will Milter, I vo'lj no -
Jooger jpmvidc tbu additional h&p thai J have in the past 
